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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Case No. 20060974-CA

MARK LEFEVRE,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
•k -k x -k

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Whether the trial court erred in denying Lefevre's motion to suppress evidence
obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure. This issue presents a question of law
reviewed for correctness. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, ^} 15, 103 P.3d 699. This issue
was preserved in a motion to suppress (R. 76-66).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The text of all relevant statutory and constitutional provisions is set forth in the
Addenda.

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

Mark Lefevre appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the Fourth
District Court after he was convicted by a jury of possession of a controlled substance, a
third degree felony; possession of drug paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor; and
interference with an an arresting officer, a class B misdemeanor.

B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition

Mark Lefe\re was charged by Information filed in Fourth District Court on
October 6, 2005 with: possession of a controlled substance in a drug-free zone with a
prior conviction, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8;
possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a class A misdemeanor, in violation
of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37a-5; and interference with an arresting officer, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-305 (R. 2-1).
Lefevre filed 120-day disposition demand on April 28, 2006 (R. 26).
A preliminary hearing was held on May 17, 2006 and Lefevre was bound over for
trial on all three charges upon a finding of probable cause (R. 34, 180).
Lefevre filed a motion to suppress on May 30, 2006 on grounds that it was
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Anicle I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution (R. 76-66). On July 5, 2006 the trial court denied
the motion by written ruling (R. 113-08).
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A jury trial was held on August 29, 2006 with Judge Lynn W. Davis presiding (R.
139-38, 181). After a ninety minute deliberation the jury convicted Lefevre on all three
counts (R. 139-38, 155).
On September 27, 2006 Lefevre was sentenced to concurrent statutory terms of 05 years, 1 year and 180 days to be served at the Utah State Prison (R. 177-76). The
sentence in this matter is to run consecutive to the sentence he was already serving at the
prison (R. 183:4).
On October 20, 2006 Lefevre filed a notice of appeal in Fourth District Court (R.
179).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
John Barson, a Provo City patrol officer, was in a parking lot at approximate!} 300
South 950-980 West in Provo on September 20, 2005 at approximately 10 p.m. assisting
other officers who were detaining and questioning some individuals (R. 180: 4-5. 13-14,
19; 181: 44, 45). He was in his uniform (R. 181: 50). Barson was providing backup and
keeping watch over the area (R. 180: 14; 181: 68-69). Barson testified that the parking
lot was well lit (R. 181:67).
Lefevre, who was not part of the group being detained, came from the apartment
complex and walked behind him in a "very brisk or abrupt manner, a soldier walk. I
noted that as he looked towards me he jerked his head towards me and then back into a
straight line, rather than just moving it from one side to the other" (R. 180: 5, 18; 181: 46,
69). He wCclenched his hands from an open palm into a fist repeatedly" (R. 180: 5; 181:

47). Barson testified that these are "physical indicators of the presence of central nervous
system stimulant" (R. 180: 5; 181: 48-49). Marijuana is not a stimulant (R. 180: 15; 181:
89-90). Barson also noticed what appeared to be the top of a lightbulb protruding from
his right front pants pocket that he tapped with his right hand before covering with his Tshirt (R. 180: 6; 181: 47, 49). Lightbulbs are used as pipes in the consumption of
methamphetamine (R. 180: 6; 181: 47, 49). Lefevre did not show any aggression
between leaving the apartment complex and getting in his car (R. 181: 75-76).
Lefevre got into his vehicle about the same time as Barson's duties as a cover
officer ended (R. 180: 6; 181: 50). Barson's marked vehicle was directly to Lefevre's left
(R. 181: 51). As Barson walked towards the vehicle, Lefevre started it, put it in reverse
and began to back out of the parking stall (R. 180: 6; 181: 66). As he stopped to pull
forward, Barson knocked loudly on his trunk lid and stated he wanted to speak with him
through an open window (R. 180: 7; 181: 50). In response, Lefevre reached over and
rolled the window up to one inch from the top. He "reached for the gear shift to put it in
drive, and then asked me why I wanted to speak with him" (R. 180: 7). Barson told him
they needed to speak about "several issues" and that he was not free to leave (R. 180: 7).
They argued briefly over Barson's right to speak with him (R. 180: 7). Barson had
observed no traffic violations (R. 180: 18). Barson had past contact with Lefevre and
was familiar with his name and face (R. 180: 19-20). Lefevre mad no aggressive moves
towards Barson while in his vehicle (R. 181: 91).
Barson asked Lefevre for his driver's license, vehicle registration and proof of
insurance (R. 180: 7). Lefevre provided the driver's license (R. 180: 7; 181: 51). Barson
4

kept the license (R. 181: 75). Barson asked him to turn the vehicle off because Lefevre
had the doors locked, windows mostly up and car in gear (R. 180: 7-8). After demanding
three times, Lefevre turned it off (R. 180: 8; 181: 52). After Lefevre turned off the engine
he made "two additional attempts to put it in gear" (R. 180: 9). Barson did not mention
his belief that Lefevre was under the influence in his report until after he had received
Lefevre's drivers license (R. 180: 17). Barson informed Lefevre he was not free to leave
(R. 181:52).
Barson observed him to be "frantic" as he picked items up off the seat, and put
them down repeatedly (R. 180: 8; 181: 51). He looked at his wallet 4-5 times and started
to reach underneath the seat (R. 180: 8; 181: 52). In addition, he turned around and
looked behind him, appearing to guage the gap between the patrol car and another parked
car (R. 180: 8; 181: 52). Barson testified that Lefevre was "in constant motion, twisting
around inside the seat" and he had red eyes (R. 180: 9; 181: 51). Barson believed "he
was under the influence" of methamphetamine, and that he was also in ''flight mode"—
looking for a way out (R. 180: 9; 181: 51-52). Barson was worried about his safety (R.
181: 53).
Barson drew his gun asked that Lefevre exit the vehicle, intending to conduct a
Terry frisk for weapons because of his behavior (R. 180: 9, 20; 181: 54). As Lefevre
stood up, Barson noticed a "three-foot long flat blade screwdriver tucked between the
edge of the driver's seat and the door, right underneath his left hand" (R. 181: 54).
Barson asked him "to face the vehicle. He didn't. I moved him towards the
vehicle by turning him, and he began to flail his arms and attempted [to] twist around
5

away from me. He ultimately twisted in the direction of another officer that was there
with me, and we wound up placing him on the ground to get physical control of him"
(R.180: 10; 181: 54-55, 85). Even after he was cuffed and on the ground, Lefevre
continued to struggle (R. 181: 55-56). Barson ended up with a deep bruise on his knee
(R. 180: 10; 181: 55, 86). The amount of violent resistance shown by Lefevre was not
common behavior for arrestees (R. 181: 55).
Eventually Lefevre calmed down and Barson stood him up (R. 181: 56). Barson
searched his person and found the following: a lightbulb that had been partialK turned
into a pipe, a bag of marijuana, and a bag of marijuana shake (R. 180: 10-11; 181: 56-59).
At some point Barson did field sobriety tests on Lefevre and checked his pulse, which at
114 beats per minute was consistent with a person being under the influence of a
stimulant (R. 180: 22-23; 181: 60). Lefevre^s speech was slurred (R. 180: 23). He had a
lack of smooth pursuit in both eyes and his pupils were constricted (R. 181: 60). Lefevre
had been uncuffed prior to the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, but afterwards became
"verbally combative and physically uncooperative again" and was recuffed (R. 181: 61).
He would thrash his arms around as he spoke (R. 181: 62). He refused to take more tests
but indicated he hadn't used drugs in at least a week (R. 181: 61). Lefevre was placed in
the rear of Barson's vehicle (R. 181: 62).
The officers also searched Lefevre's vehicle incident to arrest and found in a
duffel bag: a baggy of white powdery substance that was not methamphetamine, a glass
pipe with what appeared to be methamphetamine residue, tweezers, cigarettes, and
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additional marijuana in a small plastic pouch (R. 180: 11-12; 181: 64). Lefevre's car was
impounded and he was transported to the Utah County Jail (R. 181: 64).
The location of the parking lot was approximately one block from a commercial
daycare center (R. 180: 12).
At the jail Barson asked Lefevre to take a breath test blood test and urine test. He
refused (R. 181:64-65).
Bryan Wolken, another Provo City officer, assisted Barson with Lefevre (R. 181:
95). He had been involved in the detaining of the other individuals (R. 181: 95-96).
Wolken first noticed Lefevre walking because he "looked like he was possibly under the
influence of a controlled substance" (R. 181: 96-97). He was "clucking"—involuntarily
jerking his head and hands (R. 181: 97). Wolken next observed Barson command
Lefevre to exit the vehicle (R. 181: 97-98). Concerned there may be a problem, Walken
walked over and watched Lefevre eventually exit the vehicle (R. 181: 97-98). Lefevre
then wouldn't comply with Barson's command to put his hands behind his back but was
flailing around (R. 181: 98). "So we grabbed—both grabbed onto him and put him down
on the ground to get a better control of him and handcuff him" (R. 181: 98). Wolken put
him down on the ground (R. 181: 98). Wolken then backed away and allowed a trainee,
Officer Palmer, to assist Barson (R. 181: 99).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The level two traffic stop and detention of Lefevre, which led to the search of his
person and his vehicle, was not justified by reasonable, articulable suspicion and
7

therefore violates the Fourth Amendmenf s protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures. In addition, all evidence discovered after that unlawful detention must be
excluded as fruits of the poisonous tree.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERREIMN DENYING LEFEVRE'S MOTION
TO SUPPRESS WHERE THE LEVEL TWO TRAFFIC STOP AND
DETENTION, WHICH LED TO THE SEARCH OF HIS PERSON
AND VEHICLE, WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE
SUSPICION

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects citizens from
unreasonable seizures. U. S. Const., Amend. IV. "'Stopping an automobile and
detaining its occupants constitute a Seizure' within the meaning of [the Fourth]
Amendment[ ], even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention
brief.'" State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ^ 28, 63 P.3d 463 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse,
. 440 U.S. 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979)). To determine whether such a
traffic stop is reasonable is a two step process: One, wC[w]as the police officer's action
justified at its inception?" Two, "[w]as the resulting detention reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place?" Hansen,
2002 UT 125 at ]f 29; State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131-32 (Utah 1994).
A traffic stop is justified when it is incident to an observed traffic violation.
Hansen at <[j 30; Lopez at 1132. In this case, the traffic stop was not incident to an
observed traffic violation. In fact, Officer Barson testified that he had observed no traffic
violation (R. 180: 18).
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Nor can the level two seizure and detention of Lefevre be supported by reasonable,
articulable suspicion of criminal activity. It is clear this was no level one encounter.
Barson clearly informed Lefevre after the stop of his vehicle that he was not free to leave
(R. 180: 7; 181: 52). Level two investigative detentions, which clearly this detention was
from its inception, are generallycharacterized as "brief and non-intrusive." Hansen,
2002 UT 125 at ^ 35 (citing United States v. Evans, 937 F.2d 1534, 1537 (10th Cir.
1991)). Level two seizures must be supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion a
person has or is committing a crime. Hansen at ^j 30. At no time was Lefevre free to
terminate the encounter with Barson and thus the seizure remained at the very least a
level two encounter.
Lefevre asserts that the level two seizure was not supported by reasonable and
articulable suspicion of criminal activity which would justify the stop of his vehicle when
there was no observed traffic violations. Barson observed Lefevre walking like a soldier,
repeatedly clenching his fists, jerking his head, and that there was a lightbulb protruding
from his pocket (R. 180: 5-6, 18; 181: 46-49, 69). Barson did not observe any
aggressive behavior from Lefevre while he was walking to his car (R. 181: 75-76).
Based on these observations, Barson opined that Lefevre was under the influence of a
central nervous system stimulant (R. 180: 5; 181: 48-49). The trial court in denying
Lefevre's motion to suppress concluded that these factors constitute reasonable and
articulable facts of criminal activity. In addition, the trial court noted that Barson was
aware that Lefevre was a drug user (R. 110).
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It takes more than an inchoate and unparticularizcd hunch to satisfy the reasonable
suspicion standard. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1969).
See also, State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26, % 10, 112 P.3d 507. An officer's suspicion
must be supported by specific facts and rational inferences. Markland at ^f 10. When
reviewing a given factual situation for reasonable suspicion this Court views the totality
of circumstances and judge the conduct of the officer[s] in light of "common sense and
ordinary human experience'* giving the officer deference "to distinguish between
innocent and suspicious actions/* Markland at \ 11 (citations omitted).
Lefevre asserts that this case is akin to State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App.
1987). In Trujillo an officer detained three individuals who were found peering into store
windows at 3:30 a.m. They also appeared nervous, were in a high crime area, and in
possession of a suspicious knapsack. 739 P.2d 86, 89. No reports of criminal activity
had been made in the area. Id. In this case, Barson was present at the scene and involved
in an unrelated incident where Lefevre resides. Barson observed him walk like a soldier,
clench his fists, jerk his head. Barson also observed a lightbulb in his pocket. Based on a
hunch that he was under the influence of a stimulant, Barson conducted a traffic stop on
his vehicle. Barson did not observe any traffic violation to justify the detention. Lefevre
asserts that the way he walked and moved his head, and the fact that he had a household
item—a lightbulb—in his pocket—does not satisfy the requirement for specific and
articulable suspicion of criminal activity.
Accordingly, Barson's detention and subsequent arrest of Lefevre constituted a
Fourth Amendment violation requiring exclusion of all evidence obtained as a result of
10

that unlawful seizure. "Evidence obtained by police exploitation of a prior illegality is
tainted by the violation of a person's constitutional rights." Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at ^ 62
(citations omitted). The purpose of excluding such evidence is to "compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way—by removing the incentive
to disregard it." Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 599-600, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 Led.2d 416
(1975) (citation omitted). See also Hansen at ^| 62. Here the purpose of the illegal
conduct was to conduct a search of Lefevre's person and vehicle. Supressing the
evidence clearly will have the desired deterrent effect. Moreover, there were not
intervening factors which would mitigate the illegality. In fact, Barson drew his weapon
on Lefevre to get him out of the car and search him. Lastly there was no significant lapse
in time between the initial illegal detention and the searches of his car and person.
Hansen at Y\] 64-69. Therefore, he asserts that exclusion of all evidence obtained as a
result of the unlawful seizure and detention must be suppressed.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Lefevre requests that this Court reverse the trial court's denial of his motion to
suppress and remand this case to the Fourth District Court for further proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 11th day of June, 2007.

Margaret P. Lindsay
Counsel for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I delivered four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing
Brief of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South,
Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this 11th day of June, 2007.

Margaret P. Lindsay
Counsel for Appellant
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ADDENDA
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Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah
^ ^ y ^ z ^ u d L ^ ^ Deputy

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 051404084
MARK LEFEVRE,
Judge Lynn W. Davis
Defendant.

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. The Court having
carefully considered and reviewed the file in this matter, the memoranda submitted by both parties,
having heard oral arguments, and good cause appearing therefor, the Court now hereby makes the
following Ruling.
I.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1.

The defendant filed his Motion to Suppress and Memorandum in Support Thereof on May
30, 2006.

2.

The State filed a Response on June 13, 2006

3.

The defendant filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress on June 22,
2006.

4.

On July 5, 2006 this Court calendared the matter for oral arguments. Both parties submitted
and this Court indicated it would rule in writing.

1
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II.
FACTS
1.

On September 20, 2005, officers of the Provo Police Department responded to a call at 250
South 1000 West in Provo, Utah. Prel. Hrg. Tr., 4:24-25 (May 17, 2006). There, the officers
were met by a number of individuals in an apparently threatening situation. Id,

2.

In the course of performing his duties relative to the call, Officer Barson noted Mr. Lefevre the defendant in this case - walking past him demonstrating a robotic, "soldier like" motion.
Prel. Hrg. Tr., 5:12-18.

3.

Officer Barson also noted that Mr. Lefevre repeatedly flexed his hands into fists. Prel. Hrg.
Tr. 6:1-2.

4.

The officer additionally noted what appeared to be a lightbulb protruding from Mr. Lefevre's
pants pocket. Prel. Hrg. Tr., 6:1-6. These observations occurred in the parking lot area of an
apartment complex.

5.

Officer Barson was (and is) a certified Drug Recognition Specialist, and was familiar with the
outward symptoms caused by the use of particular drugs. Specifically, the officer understood
that jerky, robotic movement is oftentimes an indication of methamphetamine use.
Additionally, Officer Barson knew that hollowed-out light bulbs are used as a kind of "makeshift" pipe for the ingestion of methamphetamine.

6.

In addition to these facts, the officer was personally acquainted with the defendant and was
acquainted with the defendant's history of drug abuse. Prel Hrg. Tr., 6:9-14. While relevant,
this fact is less significant and given less weight than the other observations and absent the
preliminary observations could not form a basis for further inquiry. (It would have been a
2
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Level I encounter.)
Officer Barson, on foot, followed the Mr. Lefevre and observed the defendant enter a vehicle
and attempt to drive away - apparently while under the influence of some type of drug Officer Barson, still on foot, stopped the vehicle and attempted to engage Mr. Lefevre in
discussion. Prel. Hrg. Tr, 6:17-7:5.
Mr. Lefevre expressed his desire to not speak with the Officer Barson and attempted to drive
away. Officer Barson replied that the defendant was not free to leave and requested the
defendant's identification. Prel. Hrg. Tr., 7:20-8:3.
Apparently, the officer had to repeat several times to Mr. Lefevre that he was not free to leave.
Prel. Hrg. Tr, 8:7-12.
Officer Barson noted that Mr. Lefevre's movements in his vehicle were frantic and constant.
Prel. Hrg. Tr, 8:15-9:2. Additionally, the officer noted that Mr. Lefevre's eyes were bloodshot. Prel. Hrg. Tr, 9:10-12.
After some time Mr. Lefevre voluntarily exited his vehicle, but when Officer Barson
attempted to perform a weapons search of the defendant, he began resisting and "flail(ing) his
arms." Prel. Hrg. Tr, 10:3-8.
A nearby officer helped Officer Barson gain control of Mr. Lefevre.
The incident was violent enough that Officer Barson sustained a severe bruise to his knee.
Prel. Hrg. Tr. 10:10-12.
Once Mr. Lefevre was in custody the officers proceeded to search his person. They
discovered he was, indeed, carrying a hollowed-out light bulb that had apparently been used
as a drug pipe. Additionally, Mr. Lefevre was in possession of marijuana. Prel. Hrg. Tr. 10:
14-23.
A "search incident to arrest" of Mr. Lefevre's vehicle revealed additional drugs, and drug
3

paraphernalia. Prel. Hrg. Tr. 11:11-12:13.

III.
ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
The defendant argues that Officer Barson violated his Fourth Amendment rights by searching
his person without so much as reasonable suspicion. Thus, evidence obtained as a result of the
unwarranted search and illegal detention should be suppressed.
The State, on the other hand, argues that Officer Barson's and the defendant's interaction
began as a Level II encounter supported by reasonable suspicion. Additionally, the State argues that
Officer Barson had probable cause to affect an arrest of the defendant because of his refusal to
cooperate with the investigating officers and that the illicit materials discovered in subsequent
searches were properly discovered by the officers.

III.
LEGAL DISCUSSION
At the outset, this Court rejects the defendant's characterization of the initial contact between
Officer Barson and the defendant as being a Level I encounter. To properly affect a Level II
encounter Officer Barson needed reasonable articulable facts that justified his further investigation
of the defendant. See, State v. Menke, 740 P.2d 1363 (Ut. App. 1987). It is clear to this Court that
those facts were present. The officer observed motion consistent with illicit drug use. The officer
observed what appeared to be a lightbulb commonly used as a drug pipe. The officer was also aware
of the defendant's history of drug abuse1. These are reasonable, articulable facts that amount to more

1

As stated in section II of this ruling, the defendant's history ot drug use would not be an
appropriate sole basis for an officer to conduct a Level II encounter. However, that fact, when viewed in
connection with the totality of the circumstances presented here, reasonably heightened Officer Barson's
4

f.1 I f

than a mere hunch that the defendant possessed illegal drugs. See, id. Also, as the State correctly
points out, Officer Barson did not merely have the option of investigating the defendant, but rather,
the officer had the duty to investigate whether the law had, or was being broken. See, State v. Contrel,
886 P.2d 107, 110 (Ut. App. 1994). This Court notes that the defendant attempted to drive away
while apparently under the influence of drugs. Thus, the defendant presented a potentially serious
threat to the innocent traveling public. That fact alone, in the view of this Court, demanded that the
officer investigate the defendant.
The defendant makes much ado about his attempt to drive away and the officer's refusal to
let the defendant depart. Were this a case of a Level I encounter that argument would hold sway with
this Court, but, as stated above, the reasonable facts as articulated by Officer Barson vitiates that
argument. This was clearly a lawful Level II encounter from the outset.

Consequently, the

defendant's subsequent resistance to, and interference with, the lawful orders of Officer Barson and
other involved officers was a violation of the law.
Utah law provides that:"(l) A person is guilty of interference with a public servant if he: (a)
uses force, violence, intimidation, or engages in any other unlawful act with a purpose to interfere
with a public servant performing or purporting to perform an official function." Utah Code Ann. §
76-8-301 (a) (2005). The State has also correctly cites Utah case law relative to interference which
states that "it must appear that a duly constituted public officer engaged in the performance of an
official duty was obstructed or resisted by the defendant." In re State in Interest ofHurley, 501 P.2d
111 (Utah 1972) (internal citation omitted).
The defendant's actions while in his vehicle with Officer Barson attempting to engage him

suspicion and became part of the circumstances that justified investigation of the defendant. The
defendant's history is an ancillary, supporting fact. Officer Barson would have exceeded legal bounds if
he had detained the defendant simply based on the defendant's history. A level I encounter would be as
far as the Officer could go without other suspicious facts or evidence.
5
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m conversation were certainly uncooperative and could, by a jury, be found to meet the statutory
definition of interference Those actions, quite possibly, met the probable cause standard necessary
for Officer Barson to escalate to a Level III encounter Whether that was the officer's intent or not
is unclear, but in this Court's view at the point that the defendant began to interfere with Officer
Barson's proper Level II encounter and investigation, Officer Barson was justified in escalating the
encounter
If there were any doubt about the defendant's attempt to interfere with and resist the officers,
the defendant did away with that doubt by his overt resistance once outside of the vehicle From that
point on, the officers were certamlyjustified in detaining, searching, and arresting the defendant His
actions easily meet the Level III encounter probable cause threshold justifying arrest

A search

incident to arrest of the defendant's person and of the vehicle he had just exited was justified
Consequently, this Court cannot find that any of the illicit drugs, or accompanying paraphernalia was
improperly obtained, and should, thus, be suppressed at trial

IV.
RULING
For the reasons stated above the Defendant's Motion to Suppress is Denied
Signed this

/&-

day of July, 2006

°j$$

/^Honorable Lynn W Dav&f&J^L' i' j
Fourth District Court J u d & K . * ^ ^ ^
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